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Wholesome (clear, palatable, and safe) drinking water is
fundamental to public health. More than 95% of the
population of the United Kingdom have a public supply of
piped drinking water, almost all chlorinated and some
fluorinated. The bacteriologic quality of drinking water has
been maintained in accordance with well-established
guidelines (1). In the United Kingdom, water providers have
been required by law since 1847 to supply wholesome
drinking water. However, it is only in the most recent
legislation, the Water Act 1989 and its accompanying Water
Supply (Water Quality) Regulations (2), that a definition of
“wholesome” appears (3). Directives are one of the means by
which European Community legislation is applied to member
states. Two of these, the Surface Water Directive and the
Sampling Directive, concern the use of surface water as a
source of drinking water; a third, the Drinking Water
Directive (4,5), is intended to ensure a wholesome water
supply for drinking and for food and drink manufacture.
 Public Water Companies
Public water companies have considerable expertise and
resources to ensure that their supply systems are designed,
operated, and monitored to comply with the minimum
requirements of the law. U.K. legislation regards Escherichia
coli as synonymous with fecal coliforms and does not give
precise numerical values for colony counts. Baseline colony
counts should be established for each supply system, and
increases should be  investigated. Most waterborne disease is
related to fecal pollution of water sources; therefore,
microbiologic testing of water needs to identify indicators of
fecal pollution such as coliforms and E. coli, although the use
of enterococci and Clostridium perfringens as surrogate
markers is increasing. Coliforms must not be detected in 95%
of samples when >50 samples are taken from the same
sampling point during a 1-year period. Detecting E. coli in any
one sample constitutes an infringement of the regulation.
Recent U.K. legislation requires continuous monitoring of at-
risk water treatment works for cryptosporidial oocysts (6).
Supplying water containing >100 cryptosporidial oocysts per
100 L is a criminal offense; at least 1,000 L of water need to be
filtered each 24 hours.
Private Water Supplies
Private water supplies may be used solely for domestic
purposes (category 1) or on a larger scale to supply nursing
homes, hospitals, and houses (category 2). Approximately 1%
of the U.K. population obtains water from a well, borehole, or
spring, which may not be treated. The quality of water from
private supplies must comply with the requirements given in
the Private Water Supplies Regulations 1991 (7). Category 1
supplies are further divided into classes A-F, depending on
the amount of water and number of people supplied.
Monitoring private supplies is problematic since water
quality can change with the weather and smaller supplies are
monitored infrequently (8).
Outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis traced to tap water from
the main supply are uncommon but may affect large numbers
of people and cause public alarm. A recent report highlights a
new problem of Cryptosporidium parvum contamination of
filtered borehole water causing confirmed cases in 345
persons (9). Borehole supplies have been traditionally
regarded as relatively pure sources of water, so this outbreak
has implications for future monitoring and treatment of
drinking water extracted from boreholes.
Water Storage and Distribution
Water should be stored safely in large, protected
reservoirs and treated at the source, often by coarse filtration.
Water should be distributed in a purpose-designed system,
under pressure in a chlorinated form (e.g., 0.5 ppm free
residual chlorine). Storage tanks should be protected from
extraneous contamination, including by birds and vermin,
and should be free from bacteria, particularly E. coli.
Distribution systems should be controlled and free of “dead
legs” (conduits that are capped off or rarely used) and spurs;
joints and leaks should be repaired by qualified plumbers
using defined materials. Uncontrolled water supplies are
readily contaminated with coliform bacteria, environmental
mycobacteria, Legionella spp., and filamentous fungi.
Water as a Reservoir of Hospital Pathogens
While >40 Legionella spp. are known, most outbreaks of
Legionnaires’ disease are caused by Legionella pneumophila
serotypes 1 and 6; 600 to 1,300 cases are reported each year in
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the United States, although these figures may represent
underreporting (10). Legionellae are naturally distributed in
aquatic environments, growing best at temperatures of 25°C
to 42°C. Colonization is enhanced by water stagnation and
sediment buildup as a result of alterations in the plumbing of
the complex distribution systems often found in hospital hot-
water systems. Cooling towers are often implicated in
hospital and community outbreaks. Wet cooling towers (if
used) and cooling water systems should be regularly
maintained, cleaned, and disinfected. Cooling towers readily
generate fine water droplets, as they operate by spraying
water onto a packing material through which there is a
countercurrent flow of air. How systems become seeded with
Legionella is unclear, but these organisms can colonize
certain types of water fittings, pipework, and materials. In
practice, Legionella is found in many recirculating and hot-
water systems with no associated clinical infection; in fact,
the number of organisms that cause infection has not been
determined reliably and varies with host susceptibility and
species of Legionella. For these reasons, routine water
sampling for Legionella is not advocated, but sampling may
sometimes be appropriate to check the efficiency of the water
treatment regimen.
Water systems should be designed to minimize
colonization and multiplication of bacteria. Water should not
be allowed to stagnate and should be circulated at
temperatures below 20°C or above 60°C. Storage tanks and
calorifiers should be regularly inspected, cleaned, and
disinfected. In reported cases of Legionnaires’ disease in
which hot-water systems were implicated, contaminated
water droplets were most commonly disseminated by showers
and by taps with spray heads (faucet aerators). System design
is all important in preventing buildup of Legionella; actions
that lessen the risk for clinical cases include removing dead
legs, avoiding washers and gaskets made of natural rubber
(nutrient source), replacing heavily scaled faucets and
showerheads, and avoiding shock absorbers and pipe
materials not made of copper or plastic. Conditions that affect
the proliferation of legionellae include sludge, scale, rust,
algae, and organic particulates thought to provide
nutrients for growth. Infection can be minimized by good
engineering practices supplemented by heat, disinfectants,
and biocides (11).
Clinical Disease
A confirmed case of Legionnaires’ disease is defined as
clinical or radiologic evidence of pneumonia and a
microbiologic diagnosis by culture of L. pneumophila from
respiratory specimens, or a fourfold rise in serum antibody
levels against L. pneumophila serogroups (often serogroups 1
and 6). Testing for L. pneumophila antigen in urine, which is
rapid and convenient, is becoming the most common
diagnostic method. Clinical cases have also occurred because
of the inhalation of water droplets containing the blue-white
fluorescent group of legionellae, e.g., L. gormanii and L.
bozemanii. Care must be taken with the indirect
immunofluorescent antibody test to absorb any cross-
reactions from Campylobacter. Immunocompromised pa-
tients, e.g., transplant or dialysis patients or those on
cytotoxic therapy, are at higher risk for infection with
Legionella.
Legionellosis: Control by Disinfection
Ideally, hospital water systems should be free of
legionellae, but it is exceptional for a water supply to be
entirely free of aquatic organisms. Provided that water is
derived from the public mains and its quality is preserved in
the storage and distribution system by correct design,
installation, and maintenance, it can be regarded as being
microbiologically acceptable for use without further
treatment. However, if the appropriate detection systems are
in place to culture and detect nonculturable organisms, it is
likely that legionellae will be found in distribution systems
(12). Marrie et al. demonstrated that a water system may be
contaminated without clinical consequence (13), although
risk should be assessed. If regular prospective surveillance
and environmental cultures are undertaken and low levels
(<102 per L) of legionellae are found, no action is necessary;
counts of 102 to 103 on successive samples warrant a review of
control procedures.
Heat
If storing water at 60°C is not practical or acceptable or
the calorifier is not in use for 1 week or more, raising the
temperature of the calorifier water to 70°C to 75°C for 1 hour
will kill legionellae. However, this technique may not be
effective if the temperature of water at the bottom of the
calorifier does not reach 70°C.
Chlorination
Hot-water systems can be disinfected by chlorinating the
water in the header tank (20 ppm to 50 ppm,
superchlorination), allowing the water to flow to all parts of
the system, and then allowing it to stand for at least 4 hours
while not in use. The system should then be completely and
thoroughly flushed before use. Cooling towers and cooling
water systems can be chlorinated with 5 ppm for several hours
before flushing. Water in a cleaned system can then be dosed
to give a circulating level of free residual chlorine of
approximately 1 ppm, although this may increase corrosion.
Biocides
Some biocides are effective against legionellae if used in
sufficient concentrations for a sufficient time. Alternating
high-level biocide treatment with chlorination and shock-
dosing the water system are likely to be more effective than
continuous low-level dosing with a single biocide. Strategies
for preventing Legionnaires’ disease (14) and guides to
minimizing the risk are available (15).
Other Disinfection Methods
Copper-silver ionization can be used to control legionellae
in hospital hot-water recirculating systems (16). This method
electrically generates copper and silver ions, which bind to the
bacterial cell wall, causing cell-wall disruption and lysis.
Other methods for disinfecting drinking water include
ozonation, chlorine dioxide, and irradiation by UV light.
Legionella spp. and Free-Living Protozoa
Legionellae thrive in stagnant water at ambient
temperatures and may survive chlorination by residing in
sludge and scale or inside certain protozoa, e.g., Acanthamoeba,
Hartmannella, and Tetrahymena spp. While legionellae and274 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001
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most protozoan trophozoites are inactivated by 1 ppm to 2
ppm of free residual chlorine, some protozoan cysts can resist
50 ppm chlorine; intracellular legionellae may be more
resistant than the planktonic forms (17).
Rinse Water as a Source of Hospital Pathogens
Automatic washer-disinfector systems are widely used
for decontaminating flexible fiberoptic endoscopes. These
expensive scopes may be cleaned and decontaminated
manually in individual diagnostic units or in centralized
endoscopy-decontamination units. The main water supply
may contain environmental microorganisms, such as
mycobacteria, legionellae, and aerobic gram-negative bacilli,
which may recontaminate the endoscope during rinsing.
Pseudoepidemics of L. pneumophila serogroup 6 associated
with contaminated bronchoscopes have been reported (18), as
has the transmission of highly drug-resistant Mycobacterium
tuberculosis caused by inadequate cleaning and disinfection
of a bronchoscope (19). Hospital water supplies can readily
become contaminated with environmental mycobacteria, e.g.,
M. xenopi, M. abscessus, M. fortuitum, and M. chelonae; if
decontamination units do not have filters (0.2 µm) fitted to the
water supply, rinse water may become contaminated. Water
filters need to be fitted and maintained, but even this
filtration system does not guarantee bacteria-free water (20).
Environmental mycobacteria such as M. chelonae can resist
temperatures of 45°C and some disinfectants such as 2%
alkaline glutaraldehyde. Washer-disinfectors should be
installed and maintained according to manufacturer’s
recommendations. Management policies should emphasize
regular cleaning and maintenance (21). Use of contaminated
or hard water should be avoided to lessen formation of biofilm
and buildup of lime scale. Use of poor-quality water also
should be avoided, and the supply to the washer-disinfector
should be pretreated with heat and filtration and other
processes such as UV irradiation and reverse osmosis.
Additional chlorination of the water also should be
considered, as should a final endoscope rinse with sterile
water (22).
Immersion in Water
Hydrotherapy Pools: Preventing Infection
The physical structure of hydrotherapy pools, their high
water and air temperatures, and intermittently intensive use
by diverse groups of patients and staff produce potentially
hazardous conditions (23). Hydrotherapy has become
popular, and many district hospitals have installed suitable
pools. Each pool should be a self-contained part of the hospital
physiotherapy facilities with a senior physiotherapist
responsible for overall daily management. The pool should be
designed to allow water to circulate through a filter and for
the addition of a suitable disinfectant (often hypochlorite) in
appropriate amounts with a mechanism for adjusting the pH
(appropriate range 7.2 to 7.8). Pools should be cleaned
regularly, have some water replaced weekly, and be emptied
annually. Additional measures should be implemented if
users release unformed stool into the pool, and strict
adherence to the rules of cleanliness and hygiene both in and
out of the pool should be enforced. Physiotherapists,
microbiologists, and engineers should have effective working
relationships. Management programs should be established,
and careful records should be kept. Despite careful control of
water quality, users will suffer from pool-related skin, ear,
chest, and gastrointestinal infections from time to time.
Numerous microorganisms have been implicated in these
infections, including Pseudomonas  aeruginosa,  Legionella
spp., adenoviruses, and enteroviruses. Legionnaires’ disease
has been associated with whirlpool spas, where agitation and
aeration of the water enable bacteria to be inhaled (24). (The
terms spa pool, spa bath, whirlpool, and hot tub are
sometimes used interchangeably [25]). More recently, a
cluster of gastrointestinal illnesses, including one case of
hemolytic uremic syndrome and one culture-confirmed E. coli
O157:H7 infection, was attributed to a poorly maintained
swimming pool (26). Frequently, immersion of hospitalized
patients contaminates the tub environment, including the tub
water, drains, agitators, floors, and walls.
Water Births: Minimizing Infection
Water births, pioneered in the 1960s, are increasingly
being used. The perceived infection problem is that the
birthing-pool water becomes contaminated with amniotic
fluid, blood, and fecal material, all of which contain large
quantities of maternal bacteria and viruses. Risks include
bloodborne viruses, e.g., hepatitis B and C, HIV-1, and HIV-2,
and fecal-orally transmitted viruses, e.g., the enteroviruses
and adenoviruses (27). Many of these concerns may be
unfounded, and calls for maternal testing for HIV have not
been supported. A more reasonable approach is to ensure that
infection control policies for water births include instructions
for pool maintenance and decontamination, use of universal
precautions, and use of personal protective equipment for
staff (28). Postnatal surveillance of mothers and babies
should be conducted to define infection rates.
Washing or Rinsing in Water
Burns Units: Part of Irrigation Therapy
Kolmos et al. reported five patients with extensive deep
burns in whom P. aeruginosa serogroup 0-7 septicemia
developed shortly after hospital admission (29). Routine
microbiologic monitoring of such patients is not required,
provided the water quality is secured and the irrigation
tubing is decontaminated between uses.
Bathing Infants: Basic Hygiene and Appearance
At birth, infants are often diffusely covered in vernix,
amniotic fluid, and blood. Even though bathing them to
remove unsightly body fluids is very tempting, total body
immersion for preterm babies is not recommended. The skin
of a newborn is ideal for absorbing unwanted microorganisms.
In a report by Verweij et al., contaminated water was used to
wash preterm infants, leading to the colonization of four
infants and death of a fifth from Stenotrophomonas
maltophilia (30). The outbreak was controlled by reenforcing
hand disinfection, limiting use of tap water for handwashing,
and using sterile water to wash the preterm babies. For
cosmetic reasons, washing can be restricted initially to the
head and neck.
Miscellaneous Waterborne Outbreaks
Water baths used to warm up dialysis fluids (31), fresh-
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source of infection by Acinetobacter calcoaceticus var
anitratum  and P. aeruginosa. Molecular methods such as
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis or random amplification of
polymorphic DNA can confirm the relatedness of some of
these complex aerobic gram-negative bacilli. Removing the
contaminated water baths ends the outbreaks.
Holy water is a potential source of cross-infection with
various coliform bacteria, including A. baumanii and
Aeromonas hydrophila (33). Patients with widespread burns
and other debilitating skin lesions are at risk. Sterile holy
water is one solution to this concern.
A number of pseudooutbreaks have been reported that
implicate contaminated ice machines. Coliforms and
environmental mycobacteria such as M. gordonae are
frequently found in the water source (34). Pseudoinfection by
M. gordonae and others can be prevented by adequate
machine maintenance.
An outbreak of group A hemolytic streptococcal puerperal
sepsis was traced to the communal use of bidets (35).
Decontamination of the water spray nozzle and drain was
necessary to control the outbreak. Routine cleaning might
have prevented its occurrence.
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